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Abstract. A large body of literature has accumulated which examines 
how the optimal solution of an agent maximizing the expectation f a 
real-valued function, depending on a random parameter p and the 
agent's behavior x, reacts to perturbations in the first and second 
moments of p. Here, by an approximation valid for small uncertainty, 
we allow many agents and consider their behavior in a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. We also allow p to depend on the behaviors of the par- 
ticipating agents. We apply the analysis to two models, one of a Cournot 
oligopoly, the other of a cooperative of individuals where there is 
uncertainty in the return to communal work. 
Key Words. Noncooperative games, Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
parameter uncertainty, oligopoly, collective farm. 
1. Introduction 
The effects of  uncertainty on the optimal decisions of economic agents 
constitute a topic of  considerable importance but commensurate difficulty. 
The approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Refs. 1-2) finds sufficient condi- 
tions for determining particular qualitative ffects of  uncertainty or increased 
uncertainty. There, sufficient conditions often involve third derivatives of  
agents' utility functions, and complexities in interpretation often prevent 
satisfactory results being obtained. Even if reasonable convincing con- 
clusions can be reached, as in the theory of  the competitive firm [see also 
Sandmo (Ref. 3) and Ishii (Ref. 4)], extensions to cases where the dimension 
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of agents' decisions is more than one, or where the outcome to be determined 
is the result of a number of agents' decisions under uncertainty, are not 
generally productive. 
One alternative approach [Ireland (Ref. 5)], which has a restricted 
validity, but otherwise appears to offer promise of more fruitful results, is 
to consider the effects on an agent's behavior of uncertainty in a parameter 
in relation to the effects on that agent's behavior of a change in the same 
parameter under certainty. Such an approach uses an approximation which 
holds better the smaller the amount of uncertainty, and so resulting condi- 
tions are in essence necessary conditions for determining qualitative ffects 
of uncertainty. Mthough not sufficient conditions (for more than small 
uncertainty) and therefore not implying perfectly general results, they do 
have two interesting and useful properties. Firstly, they indicate likely effects 
of uncertainty--and they definitely hold for sufficient small uncertainty-- 
and secondly they allow us to discard the complementary set of outcomes 
as general qualitative predictions. Thus, if the prediction from our approxi- 
mation is that less of commodity i will be produced under uncertainty than 
under certainty, we conclude firstly that this is a likely general result and 
secondly that more to be produced under uncertainty does not always occur. 
The restrictions involved in applying this approximation approach are 
that the utility of each economic agent is a function (or can be expressed 
as a function) of a single argument which is linear in the uncertain pa- 
rameter(s) and strictly concave in the variable(s) over which the individual 
maximizes the expected value of his or her utility. Thus, for instance, a 
profit-maximizing price-taking competitive firm decides the quantity x it 
will produce, at cost c(x) ,  prior to a random price p being revealed. The 
firm's decision-maker has a subjective probability distribution over p derived 
from his knowledge of fluctuations in demand. The associated expected 
value and finite variance of p are p and o ,2, respectively. Profit is px - c (x)  
and is linear in p. If utility is a strictly concave function f profit, due to 
the decision-maker's ri k aversion, then Ireland (Ref. 6) demonstrates that 
expected utility maximizing behavior is the same as utility maximizing with 
a nonrisky price lower than/5. 
A number of other applications to the theory of the firm satisfy the 
same formal restrictions [see Ireland (Ref. 6)]. In the present paper, we 
extend the approach to consider a game among a number of agents where 
there is exogenous uncertainty concerning one or more parameters. An 
equilibrium then exists when all agents have determined their behavior prior 
to the uncertain parameter being revealed. 
In Section 2 below, we set out a formal model of m economic agents 
taking part in a game. We consider a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of agents' 
behavior in the presence of uncertainty concerning one or more parameters 
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in Section 3, and then present wo illustrative applications of the analysis 
in Section 4. Conclusions and some remaining comments are in a final 
section. The more tedious mathematics are relegated to an Appendix. 
2. A Formal Statement of the Model 
We consider a game F with a set M = {1 , . . . ,  m} of players indexed 
by i, each equipped with a behavior space X~. We define 
x '= II xj, X=r lX , ,  
j eM/{ i}  ieM 
denoting generic elements of X~, X i, X by xi, x ~, x = (x~, xi), respectively, 
i e M. Each player i ~ M is assumed to have a utility function U~:X ~ R 
with a special form. In fact, for each i e M, we posit functions f : X ~ R 
and g~ :X  ~ R n, with g~(x)= (g~(x) , . . . ,  gin(x)) r, and we set 
U~(x) = ui(y~(x)), (1) 
where 
y,(x) =f(x)  + [p(x)]~g,(x). (2) 
The function u~ : R ~ R is assumed to be strictly increasing in yi. 
Here, p(x)=(p l (x ) , . . . ,p , (x ) ) ' r~R ", for each x~X,  and p(x) is a 
random vector which has the particular form 
p(x) = t~(x) + ,~{r + SO(x)}, 
where 
if(x) = a + Bqt(x) 
(3) 
(4) 
with a = (a l , . . . ,  a,)  r c R n, B an n x n diagonal matrix whose diagonal is 
b = (b l , . . . ,  b,) r 6 R", ~/,: X -  R n a function (0(x)  = (~Ol(x),. • •, O,(x))r), 
a ~ R, r = (q , . . . ,  r,) r a random vector, and S an n x n diagonal matrix 
with diagonal s = (s l , . . . ,  sn) r of  random variables. The means of  r and s 
are given by E{r} = E{s} = 0, and we denote the covariance matrices E{rr r} 
by V and E{ss r} by W, respectively. Furthermore, r and s are assumed to 
be independent random vectors, i.e., 
E{r, sj} = O, i,j = 1 , . . . ,  n. 
We assume, for each i ~ M, that Xi is an nt-dimensional Euclidean 
space, n~ --- n, and that the functions u~,f, g~ are twice continuously differenti- 
able, as is the function 4'. 
Each agent i ~ M is understood to maximize the expected utility E{u~} 
over x~ ~ X~. 
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With these basic data, we will study solutions x(a, b, a) of the game 
F according to a Cournot-Nash (noncooperative) solution, the solution 
_x = _x(a, b, a)  is assumed to be locally unique within some neighborhood 
for all possible (relevant) values of (a, b, a). In each case, our interest is 
in comparing the effect of (a, b) on _x with that of a. In the style of Ireland 
(Ref. 6), where nevertheless p is independent of x and M = {1}, we are able 
to study (locally) the relations between 
_~(~) -g  (5) 
on the one hand, and 
Og(~, b)/aal,=a and Og(a, b)/Oblb=~ (6) 
on the other, where _~(a, b) = x(a, b, 0) denotes the associated solution in 
the certainty case where a =0, ~(a)=x(5, /~,  a) denotes the associated 
solution in the case where (a, b) is held fixed to (~,/~), and 2 = _x(~,/~, 0).
In the case of a single agent (m = 1), the vector p(x) can be interpreted 
as a vector of prices dependent on the agent's decisions x, which may be 
employment levels of factors of production, amounts of commodities to be 
produced, marketing decisions, etc. The agent may have market power, i.e., 
prices dependent on the agent's behavior, in the way defined above in (3) 
and (4). Then, _Y(a)-_~ is the effect of uncertainty of magnitude z~ on 
optimal decisions and o~(a, ~))/Oa evaluated at a = a and 0~(~, b)/ab evalu- 
ated at b =/~ are the changes in optimal decisions given a = O (certainty) 
of changes in a or b evaluated at (~i,/~). The effect of uncertainty on decisions 
is thus to be related to the effects of changes in/~(x) due to changes in a 
or b. Thus, for instance, the effects of uncertainty concerning the intercept 
and slope of a linear price function p(x) would be related to the effect of 
parametric hanges in such a price function under certainty. 
In the case of a number of agents, m > 1, agent i has control over the 
variables 
X i ~ (X i l  , • . . , Xin~, X i ,  n+l ,  • . . ~ X in i ) *  
The variables (x~.,+l,..., xg,,) are supposed to have no influence on the 
other agents, i.e., we assume from the beginning that 
Of Joxik--=O and OgJOxlk=-O, k=n+l  . . . .  ,ni,j#i. 
An equilibrium is found as the Cournot-Nash noncooperative solution to 
the m-person game, where each agent i is maximizing his or her expected 
utility given x i, that is, the decisions of the other m-  1 agents. In the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium agents are not affected by uncertainty in each 
other's behavior: this is determined; rather, each agent is influenced by the 
uncertainty in the p(x) function due to the random vectors r and s. If p(x) 
JOTA: VOL 49, NO. 3, JUNE 1986 353 
represented a linear inverse industry demand curve where the industry was 
characterized by a Cournot oligopoly, then although the parameters o f  
demand were uncertain, aggregate supply would be determined at a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium where each supplier had no wish to change his 
output plan given other firms' outputs, and his probability distribution over 
r and s. Note that the p(x) function is independent o f / - -a l l  firms sell at 
the same price--but hat the weight g~(x), in this example output of the ith 
firm, may be agent specific. If p(x) is a vector of functions, then some 
elements may not affect all agents and some may only affect a single agent. 
3. Approximation 
The solution _x = _x(a, b, a) that we examine here is obtained by 
max E{ui(y~(x~, _x~))}, i = 1 , . . . ,  m. (7) 
x icX  / 
First-order conditions give 
(a/Oxi)E{ui(yi(x¢, _xi))}lx,:~ = 0, i= 1 , . . . ,  m. (8) 
In order to compare (5) and (6), we examine (8) when (a, b) = (d,/~) 
and obtain the implicit form 
F(£ ~)= -~G(£ ~), 
where (see Appendix) 
F, G: R E '~ x R ~ R ~i~M''. 
Linear approximation of F and G around (_~, a) = (_x, 0) gives 
Vg, 
+ ~20,(h~(g)) (g) diag(g,(g)) 
[~(_~)] ~ (~,(_~)) } wg,~(_~) + diag , i= 1 , . . . ,  m, (9) 
where 
l/ I 
p~(y,) = -u ,  (yi)/ u,(y,), 
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the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the ith agent, 
h,(x) =f~(x) + [ ~(x)]~gdx), 
[ g,1(x) ~l(x) ] 
g~(x)  = " . , 
L g,.ix) q,.(x) 
diag(g,(x))=[g"£ x) 0 )1  
• .g~. (x  ' 
diag(~(x)) = [01(oX). ' ~ 0(1)]. 
To find 
Ox°(a, b)/Oata=a and O_~(gt, b)/Ob[b=5, 
we set a = 0 in (8) and implicity differentiate with respec[ to a and b to 
obtain (10a) and (10b) (see Appendix): 
oh, Tox rog,(.,q T 
S)+Lox  _x,j =o, (10a) 
(O/Ox )[ Oh,( ; ) ] r  _-5-0;" g) + [0@( £) ] r  diag(gj (g)) 
LOx~- 3 at ~(a' Lax, .1 
+ (g) diag(0(_~)) =0, i= 1 , . . . ,  m. (10b) 
Using (10a) and (t0b) in (9) now gives the summary comparison we seek: 
LOx~ - j 
x (5, g)Vg,(;)+~(a,b)Wg~(~) , i= l , . . . ,m,  (11) 
where 
fi, = p,( h,(g) ). 
Equation (11) is the major result of this paper. It is a very general 
result relating to a set M = {1,. . . ,  m} of agents, each making many decisions 
and faced with n prices or other parameter functions each with two kinds 
of uncertainty (r and s). A general interpretation of (11) will not be 
attempted, but rather we present in the next section a number of examples 
and applications which provide useful insights concerning the nature of a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium under exogenous uncertainty. In some of the 
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applications, we focus on an average or aggregate measure of decisions, 
rather than individual level decisions. We also consider the case of all 
identical agents (at least in their behavior under certainty, although they 
may have different attitudes to risk) and of just two agents. These kinds of 
assumptions are widely used in discussions of Cournot-Nash equilibria in 
the existing literature. 
4. Examples and Applications 
4.1. Cournot Oligopoly. The model described in Section 2 has an 
obvious application in oligopoly theory. Consider m firms each producing 
an identical product, the industry demand for which is represented by the 
stochastic inverse demand function (n = 1) 
p(x)  = a - bQ + a( r -  sQ) ,  
where 
Q:~ X i 
i=1 
and (r, s) are stochastic. Each agent has the same subjective probability 
density function on r, and similarly on s. Random r implies uncertain 
intercept, and random s implies uncertain slope of the inverse demand 
function. 
Each firm maximizes the (expected) utility from profit, so that the ith 
firm chooses xi given (true in equilibrium) assumptions about _x i, ex ante 
of (r, s) being revealed. Profit for the ith firm is 
y i (x )  = ( a - bQ)x i  - ci(xi) + a ( r -  sQ)x i ,  (12) 
so that 
and 
hi (x)  = -c i (x i )  + O(x)x i ,  
LOxi  - 1 ' " '  
where  ~i in the ith component of the m-vector, 
4;i = + 
Note that we have assumed no local decisions, i.e., 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
ni = n, for all i ~ M. 
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Applying the analysis of Section 3 then leads to the summary comparison 
(11) being of the simpler form, 
[L  . . . .  t;, ~,+L.. . ,  ~](_~-_~) 
= ~%~,[£ . . . ,  £ 4;, + £ £ . . . ,  ~,](og/oa) 
+~%wOg,[£...,£g,+g~£...,f~](ag/ob), i=l, . . . ,m. (16) 
Equation (16) holds for all i, and is useful in a number of particular cases. 
Case (i). Firms are identical under certainty, but have different atti- 
tudes towards risk [i.e., Yi(')= Y~('), all i, j, but different utility functions]. 
Then, adding Eq. (16) over all i yields, using3i =3J, all i,j so that gl = O/m 
(but _Yi is not. necessarily equal to ~), and q~ = ~b, all i, we have 
i=1 
+,~ WQ_(mb+,h)(Q/m)(o@ob) ~ (pdm), 
i= l  
or  
i= l  
Thus, the proportionate reduction in industry output due to uncertainty in 
the intercept of the inverse demand function alone (W = O) is 
(Q-Q)/Q=-a2V(oQ/oa)(1/m) ~ (fiJm), (18) 
i=1 
and this depends on the amount of uncertainty a 2V, the response of industry 
output defined by a Cournot equilibrium to a parallel shift under certainty 
m A oQ/oa, and the average coefficient of absolute risk aversion ~i=1 (pl/m). 
VCe would expect oQ/oa > 0, and so, if on average there is risk aversion, 
~1 (t3i/m) > 0), then industry output will be less under uncertainty. Uncer- 
tainty concerning the intercept of the inverse demand function thus involves 
an industry output reduction analogous to that for a reduction in the 
intercept under certainty. 
Note that, if uncertainty is involved only in the slope of the inverse 
demand function, then, for an (on average) risk-averse industry, such 
uncertainty produces a qualitatively similar response to an increase in b 
under certainty. An increase in b, like a reduction in a, produces lower 
profits and less utility. 
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Case (ii). Suppose that c~'(~) = ~, all i, i.e., ~, = q~, all i, and t~fi~ =0, 
all i. In this case, it is no longer assumed that outputs and responses to 
parameter changes under certainty will be the same for all i. Nevertheless, 
again add (16) over all i and obtain 
(mb+ g)(Q_ - Q. ) = -a  OV(mb + ck)(oQ_ /oa)  + a owO(mb + g)(oO/ob) 
(19) 
or  
2A o A o 
O-  O_ = o[ v(og/oa) - wg(og/ob)], (20) 
which is a result comparable with (18), so that the same interpretation of
response to risk can be made if firms are not identical under certainty, but 
have the same slope of marginal cost function e and the same output- 
weighted coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Case (iii). Suppose that we have only two firms, m = 2. Define 
c1= c~'(g)+2/~ and c2= c2(_x2)+2b, 
and assume as in Case (ii) that 
A A A A 
plX1 = p2X2 = O. 
Then, the formulas for _xl- _xl and _x2- _x2 become very much simpler, even 
though el is not necessarily equal to c~, 
X] -- -Xi = -012 VO(O_2~i/Oa) -t- of 2 W(g  1 AF X A2)(OXi/Ob), i = 1, 2. (21) 
Again, the same interpretations are possible as in Cases (i) and (ii), only 
here behavior relates to a particular firm, rather than the industry as a whole. 
Alternatively, assume that, as in Case (i), both firms are identical under 
certainty, so that 
C 1 = -= C; 
only their attitudes towards risk differ. Then, 
g, -x_ '2=-o~2[ (~+Y, ) /C -~) ] (~, -~) [V(Og i /Oa)  - WQ(o~dob)]gi,  (22) 
so that, assuming 
V(O_~i/oa)- W()(O~,/ob)>O and (e+/~)/(e- /~)>o,  
we have that the smaller output under uncertainty is produced by the firm 
with the higher coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
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4.2. Collective Firms and Private Plots. The application in Section 4.1 
only considered one decision variable per agent (ni = n = 1, all i), and yet 
one major aspiration of the procedure outlined in Section 3 was to allow 
consideration of multiple decision variables. Here, we will show this possi- 
bility of applying the analysis to a simple model of a collective farm where 
the individual worker i ~ {1, . . . ,  m} chooses the allocation of his time to 
work on the communal land (ki hours), work on his private plot of land (l~ 
hours) and leisure [(E - k~ - I) hours]. For a discussion of collective farms, 
see Bonin (Ref. 7), Ireland and Law (Ref. 8), Oi and Clayton (Ref. 9), and 
Sertel (Ref. 10), where the last of these references purports a different 
analysis, understanding workers to be partners. The utility of an individual 
member is given by (1), where (2) is of the form 
y~ = p[ q( K )/ m] + z~( l~) - [3~( k~ + I~), (23) 
and p =/~ + o~r. 
We write 
K= ~, k~, L= ~ 1~, 
i=1 i=1 
so that q(K) is total output of the communal plot which is sold to the state 
at a price p per unit and then the revenue is distributed equally among all 
workers on the collective farm. The individual obtains an income- 
equivalent return of zi(li) from the private plot, and -/3g(ki + l~) represents 
the cost in terms of leisure of working on both the communal and private 
plots. Nonnegativity conditions on k~, l~, E -  k~- l~ are assumed to be 
satisfied at all interesting equilibria. The form of (23) is rather special, but 
others can be found which still satisfy (2). Now, 
h,(kl, 11, k2, 12) = p[q(K)/m] + z,(l,) -/3,(k, + l,), (24a) 
g~(ka, l~, k2, /2) = q(K)/m, (24b) 
so that, for just two individuals (m=2) ,  the left-hand-side of Eq. (11), 
stacked for i = 1, 2, is 
"~q"/2 - ~ ~' -~  ~' fiq"/2 
-[3;' (z~' -~ ' )  0 
~q"/ 2 0 fiq"/ 2 - fl'~ 
o o -~  
0 ] 
where the components of the matrix are evaluated at 
(k,, I,, k2, 12)= (G,, L, L). 
(25) 
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Describe the matrix in (25) as H; then, the right-hand side of the stack of 
equations (11) is 
Pl 
2 " -~  [q(_K)/2] V ~2 
A 
0 P2 
a/d_l,/dP / 
k aJd @ J 
(26) 
Now, simple results can be obtained in at least two cases. 
Case (i). Let Pl = fi2 = P. Then, provided ~- l  exists, 
;_i-g,=-a2[q(~)/2]V~(d_~,/dff), x = ( k,, l, ), i= 1,2. (27) 
Thus, for each variable and for each individual, the response to uncertainty 
in price from communal output is the same constant 
A = -ot2[q(g)/2]V~ 
of the respective adjustment to a change in/~. 
Case (ii). Now, consider the agents as identical in the certainty situ- 
ation [same h(.) function], but allow them to have different attitudes to 
risk (t;i). Then, (26) can be written as 
. z,, 
_o2[q(_K)/2]V Pl P2A //~q,,_13, , _/3, , /  , (28) 
o ~2 L -/3" ~"-/3"J [a;/a~l 
as  
d~l / dp = d~2 / d~ 
etc. Now, add the first and third rows and the second and the last rows of 
(27) and (28) to obtain 
fiq"-/3" -/3" ffq,,_/3" 
-W z"- W -/3" 
[ pq"- tr' 
= L -/3" 
kl -- A-kA1 
z f, j 
ir_ -q 
z"-/3"J L _L- ~ J 
from (25), and 
-a  [q(_K)/2]V(pl + pz)L _fl,, 
-." 
z"-f l" JL d_L/dp J
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from (28). Thus, provided the inverse of 
[ /~q"-/3" -~" l  
-#" z"-/3"J 
exists, we have 
2 
L -  _L J = -a  [q( _K)/2] V(f31 + p2)L d[/dff] (29) 
Again, the relationship between _K -~ and d~/d~ is the same as 
between _L-_L and d~/d~, so that uncertainty in communal product price 
has an effect on total labor supplies analogous to a reduction in that price 
under certainty, if individuals are, on average, risk averse. 
The application above can be generalized in a number of directions. 
Particularly, m > 2 presents no problem. For Case (ii), other distribution 
rules for communal plot revenue, such as according to individual abor 
input [see Ireland and Law (Refs. 5 and 11)], and other specifications for 
(2) can be accommodated with no additional difficulty. 
5. Conclusions and Extensions 
We saw in Section 4 how, by appropriate assumptions and restrictions, 
Eqs. (11), all i, could be used to relate differences in individual or aggregate 
behavior due to uncertainty in parameter to responses to changes in that 
parameter under certainty. Consider one such result, Eq. (27). Suppose one 
posed the question, what difference in parameter value under certainty 
would produce (approximately) the same behavior as the given amount of 
uncertainty, i.e., Ap which solves 
g~( o~ ) = _#,( p + ap  ). 
The answer is simply [for the result (27)] 
2 " Ap=-a  [q(_K)/2]Vp, (30) 
and Ap of opposite sign could be used as a compensation to maintain the 
same behavior with the onset of uncertainty. Note, however, that this would 
overcompensate a risk-averse individual in terms of his expected utility. An 
Arrow-Pratt risk premium, such that utility is equivalent to that under 
certainty, would be approximately one-half of Ap in (30). 
We have concentrated our analysis on a Cournot-Nash noncooperative 
solution. However, other possible solution concepts to the game F might 
be applied and can be the subject for further research. One obvious one 
we should mention here is a cooperative solution. In the case of identical 
utility functions and cost functions, an oligopoly problem such as in Section 
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4.1 reduces to maximizing the expected utility of an average firm, with 
respect o all decision variables x (xi =- x). Then, 
forms a square nonsingular matrix, and immediately 
g - g = -~2j{(O_~/Oa) Vg(g) + (oglOb) Wg+(g)}. 
It is likely that most other solution concepts to the game do not yield 
such tractable results as the Cournot-Nash solution. In particular, a 
Stackelberg solution appears unlikely to be simplified by the application 
of the approach we have used here. However, generalizations of the Cour- 
not-Nash solution involving nonzero conjectural v riation of other agents' 
responses to an agent's own change in behavior may well lead to further 
results. Confirmation of these propositions i a matter for further esearch. 
6. Appendix 
The Cournot-Nash solution x(a, b, a) to the game F considered in 
Section 2 is characterized by the following set of equations: 
(o/ox,)~{u,(y,(x,, _x'))}l~,~x, = 0, i=  1 , . . . ,  m, 
or  
Eul(y,(x))[Oy,(x)/Ox,] =0, i= 1 , . . . ,  m. (31) 
By definition of y~, 
Oy,/ Ox, = Oh,/ Oxi + ar r ( ogJ  Ox, ) + a[ g,( x ) ] r s (  ogs / Ox, ) 
+ a[~fi(x)]rS(Ogi/Oxi), 
where 
hi(x) := f (x) + aTgi(x) + [ qJ(x) ]TBg,(x). 
o, (31) becomes 
E{u~(y~(x))}[Oh,(x_ )/Ox,] r + aE{u~(y,(x))[Og,(x_ )/Oxi]rr} 
+ aE{u:(y,(x))[OO(x_)/Ox,]rSg,(x)} 
+ aE{u~(y,(x))[Og,(x)/Oxi]rSO(_x)} = O, i = 1 , . . . ,  m. (32) 
Now, calculate O_~/Oa and o~/ob, set a = 0 in (32), and obtain 
u~(hi(x)[Ohi(~)/Ox,] r=  O, i= 1 , . . . ,  m, 
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or, since u~(.) is strictly increasing, 
[Oh,(~(a, b))/Ox,] r = 0, i = 1 , . . . ,  m. (33) 
Notice that, from (33), we also have 
[Oh,(_~)/Ox,] r =0, i= 1 , . . . ,  m. (34) 
Equation (33) written out gives 
[of(x°(a, b))/Oxi] T + [Ogi(~(a, b))/Oxi]Ta 
+ [0(~(a, b))]TB[Ogi(~(a, b))/Ox~] 
+ [gi(_~(a, b))] TB[Og(~(a, b))/Oxi] = 0, i = 1 , . . . ,  m. (35) 
Differentiation with respect o a and then b of (35) at (a = d, b =/~), yields 
(10a) and (10b), respectively. For determining -g ,  set (a, b)= (a, b) in 
(32), and obtain 
E {u~(y,(g) )}[Oh~(g)/Oxz] r = ( -a  )[ E {ul(y,(g) )[Ogi( ~)/ Oxi]r r} 
+ E{ul(y,(g))[OO(g)/Oxi]rSg,(g) 
+ E{u:(y~(g))[Og~(~_)/Ox,]rSq4"_x)}], i = 1, . . . ,  m. (36) 
Let the left-hand side of (36) be defined as F~(~, o~) and the three right-hand 
side terms inside the square brackets as G~(_~, a), l = I, II, III, respectively. 
First, consider 
FI(_x.', a) ] 
F(g, a) := Fm(~, a) J" 
Linear approximation of F around (_~, a) = (_~, O) is given by 
F(g, o~ ) ~ F( ;, O) + [OF(g, O)/ ox] (g-  g) + [oF(g, 0)/o~]~, 
or  
F,(g, ol) = F,(g, O)+[OF,(g, O)/Ox](g- g)+[OF~(g, O)/Oot]a, i= 1, . . . ,  m. 
Now, 
Fi(g, O) = ul(hi(g))[Oh,(g)/Ox,] r = 0, 
~(g,  °~)=[~(g)]TE(u: ' (Y , (g)) [~(_x)]} 
+ E{u~(yi(g))}(O/Ox 
(37) 
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~(~, o)= ~:(h,(;))(a/ax) [ ~ h, (~)] ~ 
- - LOx i -  .J ' 
l - Laa - JJLax; - .j " 
aF~ ~(_x,o)=o, 
and thus 
F~(g, a) ~- u;(h~(g))(o/ox) (g) (g -g ) ,  i= 1,..., m. (38) 
Linear approximation of the term in the square brackets on the right-hand 
side of (36) is the sum of the linear approximations of the three terms in 
these brackets. We can rewrite G~(_x, a) as 
G,( x_', a ) = E { u';(y~(_~) ) j~ 1 rj[ ag~( "x ) / ax~] r} 
= L E{u~(Y,(g))rj}[ag,j('-x)/Ox~] r. 
j=l  
Further, 
, . . T . G~(g, 0) = ~ u~(h,(_x))E{o}[Og~(_x)/Oxl] =0, 
j=] 
ax (# ,a )= (g) E u'[(y,(g)) ('_x) rj 
j= l  
go + E E{u~(y,(i))rA(o/ox) 7x('_ x) , 
j= l  
Oql(g,o) =o, 
Ox 
OGi _ L ~a (_x,a)= E u~'(y,(g)) (g) rj (_~) , 
j= l  
oy,/ oo~ =/:g,(g) + [ 6( g) ] ~sm( "_x ), 
(g, o) = E u'[(h,(g))E{r~g,(g)t)+[O(g)]Tsm(g)rj (g) 
j= l  
By definition, 
E{~r T} = Vi. (jth row of V), 
E{r~s,,} = O; 
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SO, 
[? aG~(g,O)= ~ u~!(h,(g))V;.g,(g) (g) 
0o~ j= x 7:[ v,.g,(g) 
= u~ ( h,(_~) )[ ~(_~) ]
V..g,(g) 
= u~(h, Vg,(g). 
Therefore, 
G~(g, . . . . .  ~ A a) ~ aui (h,(_x)[Ogi(_x)/Ox,] Vgi(x_), 
In a similar way, we can obtain 
(39) 
i= 1 , . . . ,  m. (40) 
G~'(x_', a) ~ au~'(h,(~))[a@(~)/axi] r diag(g,(_2)) W diag(m(_~))@(_~), 
i= 1 , . . . ,  m, (41) 
Gin(:% a) -~ au'{(h~(g))[Og~(g)/Ox~] r diag(q,(g)) W diag(q,(2))g~(g), i \ _ ,  
i= 1,.. o, m. (42) 
Then, (38)-(42) combined give 
F, = -oL(  O~-l- a~l - I  - G~H), 
which, using (36) and (37), can be simplified to yield Eq. (9). Then, with 
(10a) and (10b), we have 
Lax,-  _I (g-x-)=-azP'(h'(~))(a/ax) (g) 
which is Eq. (11). 
Note that the dimensions of the terms in (11) are 
ro,,  1 (a/ax) (~)  , n ,x  n,, 
Lax , -  _1 i=1  
i=1  
a, p,( h,(~) ), I x 1, 
~W,  nxn,  
g,(~_), g, (x), n x 1, 
a#_/aa, a#_/ab, ~ n, x n. 
i=1  
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